The application of formal techniques can contribute much to the quality of software, which is of utmost importance for safety-critical embedded systems. These techniques, however, are not easy to apply. In particular, methodological guidance is often unsatisfactory. We address this problem by the concept of an agenda. An agenda is a list of activities to be performed for solving a task in software engineering. Agendas used to support the application of formal speci cation techniques provide detailed guidance for speci ers, templates of the used speci cation language that only need to be instantiated, and application independent validation criteria. We apply the agenda approach to a particular class of embedded safety-critical systems, the formal speci cation of which has been investigated in the case-studies of the German Espress project during the last two years.
Introduction
Every software-based system potentially bene ts from the application of formal techniques. For the development of mission or even safety-critical embedded systems, however, their use is of particular advantage, because the potential damage operators and developers have to envisage in case of malfunction may be much worse than the additional costs of applying formal techniques in system development.
A major drawback of formal techniques is that they are not easy to apply for the average software engineer. Besides the facts that users of formal techniques need an appropriate education and have to deal with lots of details, they are often left alone with a mere formalism without any guidance on how to use it. Hence, methodological support is a key issue to bring formal techniques into practice.
Methodological support for speci cation development must be abstract enough to cover a signi cant range of applications, but also detailed enough to provide real guidance to developers. To achieve this aim, the problem-related ne-grained knowledge acquired by experienced developers needs to be made explicit and represented in a way that supports its reuse. Agendas, as introduced in 20, 21] , provide a concept for representing methodological process knowledge for particular software architectures on a relatively ne-grained level of detail. In this paper, we demonstrate the application of the concept of agendas to a particular class of embedded safety-critical systems. The architecture we study is that of a cyclic software component { a piece of software in a technical system which is triggered in regular time intervals by its environment to compute output values (usually commands to some actuators) from given input values (usually sensor values), and an internal state. The agenda we present for this architecture is condensed from case studies performed in the Espress project 1 . Figure 1 shows the basic Espress process model. The agenda presented in this paper guides the development of a requirements speci cation. Such a requirements speci cation is further validated and serves as a basis for safety analyses, test case generation, and software design.
Our agenda for cyclic software components elaborates on two particular aspects of embedded systems, motivated by the demands of the Espress application context. First, special care is taken to accurately develop the embedding of the software in its surrounding technical system. Second, quality requirements such as high-level or safety-related conditions which have to be guaranteed by the software need to be treated systematically. The general Espress methodology requires that { if possible { these requirements are speci ed as properties, which have to be logical consequences of an explicitly constructed model of the software. The redundancy introduced by this approach increases the potential for checking the consistency Outline of this Paper. Section 2 introduces the Espress notations and tools we use. In Section 3 we discuss the concept of an agenda in general. Section 4 presents the concrete agenda for cyclic software components and its application to the case study of an intelligent cruise control system. In Section 5, we discuss related work, before concluding in Section 6.
Notations and Tools
We use the Espress notation SZ 2, 4] to express the speci cations developed with our agenda for cyclic software components. This notation provides a semantically well-de ned combination of the Statemate languages 16] (namely statecharts and activity charts), the formal speci cation language Z 41], and an extension of Z by temporal interval logic 5]. The Statemate languages and Z have been chosen for Espress because of their relevance in industrial contexts and their fairly good tool support. Interval logic is used because of its relation to nondeterministic automata and regular expressions, concepts which are familiar to engineers.
Outline of SZ
A SZ speci cation consists of so called process class de nitions, which cluster pieces of the constituting notations. A process class describes the interfaces and behavior of a set of processes, the instances of the class. Figure 2 shows the components of a process class:
A speci cation of the process structure, i.e. aggregation and association with instances of other classes, and the data-ow between these instances. This is represented by Statemate's activity charts 16].
A speci cation of the data space of the process, including constant de nitions, data shared with the environment, internal data, and transformations of data. The data space is speci ed using conventional Z { except that schemas may have associated a certain role in the context of the process class. Schema roles include PORT { declares data shared by the process with the environment DATA { declares data private to the process INIT { constraints the initial value of the data space GUARD { speci es a condition on the data space OP { speci es an operation (a transformation of the data state) PROPERTY { speci es an invariant of the data space A speci cation of the dynamic behavior of the process, based on statecharts.
The transitions of statecharts are labelled with pairs of GUARD and OP schemas. A transition is taken if its source state is active, and the guard schema is true on the current data state. Its e ect is a transformation of the data state as speci ed by the OP schema. A speci cation of selected dynamic properties which are asserted for the process, expressed by an embedding of discrete temporal interval logic into Z. These are given in special schemas tagged with the phrase ASSERTION DYN.
Semantics of SZ
The semantic foundation of SZ is not subject of this paper. Our agenda for cyclic software components expressed in SZ can be understood without a deeper understanding of the semantics of SZ. For those readers interested in this subject, we informally describe some aspects of the semantics below. Step Algorithm. The traces of the data view are a superset of the traces which result from an adaption of the statechart step algorithm to our model. We give an informal explanation of this adaption, which is the major gluing point of our semantic integration of Statecharts and Z. For a detailed description of the conventional statechart step algorithm see 18] .
The input for the step algorithm is the current process status , i.e. the set of Statechart-states the process currently resides in and a binding of the schema DataSpace. Using this information, the set of enabled transitions is computed. A transition is enabled if all of its source states are active and the guard of its label is true for the data binding. From this set, a maximal non-con icting 2 set is computed by removing those transitions that are in con ict with an enabled transition of higher priority 3 , and non-deterministically removing transitions that have equal priority with con icting transitions.
From the maximal set of non-con icting transitions, the transformation to perform on the data state is synthesised by merging the Z operations of the noncon icting transitions. The main complication here is to treat racing, the situation where two or more operations of the non-con icting transitions write the same variable. To this end, the operations are grouped according to common variables they write: whenever two operations have a common variable x 0 in their signature, they are joined to the same group. Let Op ij be the operations such that j ranges over the groups and i j over the operations in each group. Then the merged data state transformation is de ned in Z as follows:
Op ij Thus inside each group one operation is chosen nondeterministically, whereas the groups altogether are executed in parallel. The nondeterministic choice inside a group re ects racing resolution on the level of Z operations.
To describe the actual data transformation associated with a step, two further details need to be considered: ensuring that invariants speci ed in the data view of a process class are treated, and ensuring that those variables which are not written in a step keep persistent. Let W denote the set of variables not written by Op re (i.e. those variables whose primed version do not appear in the signature) and which are not declared to be derived 4 :
It is required that the precondition of the synthesised operation Op step be true under the current variable binding. Otherwise the step algorithm is unde ned for the given . Thus the step algorithm is a partial, nondeterministic mapping (relation) from process states to process states. Since the transitions are non-con icting, and pre Op step needs to hold for , it is ensured that the new process status 0 { if existent { is valid according to the statecharts structure and is an element of DataSpace.
Temporal Model Properties. For the temporal model properties, a trace semantics is used. The correctness of a model according to its temporal properties is stated by ModelTraces ) TemporalTraces (or ModelTraces TemporalTraces, resp.), where ModelTraces are those traces which can be constructed from applying the step algorithm to the initial states of a process class. A more detailed account of the temporal semantics we use is given in 5].
2 Two transitions are said to be in con ict if the intersection of the set of states they are exiting is non-empty.
3 A transition has a higher priority than another transition if its context is an ancestor of the other transition's context. 4 SZ allows variables of the data space to be agged as derived from the value of other variables.
The value of these variables is implicitly de ned in each step from the invariants of the data view. Semantically this just means that those variables are not subject of implicit persistency. 
Tool support for SZ
As the integrated notations of SZ are syntactically and semantically preserved, tools for them can be reused. \Glueware" has been designed in Espress to constitute a tool environment which integrates existing tools such as Statemate, the deduction system Isabelle 34], the model checker SMV 30], the extendable text editor XEmacs, and newly written tools developed in Espress, such as the embedding of Z in the higher-order logic of Isabelle, HOL-Z 28], a type checker for SZ, a compiler for Z, and others. In the resulting environment, whose principal design is described in 6], SZ speci cations can be edited, browsed, analysed by deduction and model checking, and executed for the purpose of animation. For the agenda we present in this paper, the following capabilities are of particular interest:
With HOL-Z we can derive preconditions of operations, check for the existence of initial states and the consistency of invariants, and analyse the completeness of transitions of statecharts. With SMV we can model-check the validity of temporal model properties w.r.t. the constructed model. The screenshot in Figure 3 shows a session with the Espress tool environment, working on the speci cation of an intelligent cruise control system, which has been developed using the agenda for cyclic software components we present in this paper. The charts edited under Statemate are automatically mirrored in the view of the SZ speci cation edited under XEmacs. The analysis tools are running in the background, and can be activated by context-sensitive popup-menus associated with the SZ text.
Agendas
Software development comprises a number of development activities, the result of each of which is an artifact, such as a requirements document, a formal specication, program code, and test cases. Experienced software engineers have over time acquired problem-related ne-grained knowledge how to perform the various development activities.
To date, such expert knowledge is rarely made explicit. This forces each software engineer to gain experience from scratch. Previously acquired knowledge is not reused to support software processes and not employed to educate novices.
An agenda is a means to explicitly represent software development knowledge. It gives guidance on how to perform a speci c software development activity. Agendas can be used for structuring quite di erent activities in di erent contexts. We have set up and used agendas that support requirements engineering, speci cation acquisition, software design using architectural styles, and developing code from speci cations 19] . Agendas are especially suitable to support the application of formal techniques in software engineering.
An agenda is a list of steps to be performed when carrying out some task in the context of software engineering. The result of the task will be a document expressed in a certain language. Agendas contain informal descriptions of the steps. With each step, templates of the language in which the result of the task is expressed are associated. The templates are instantiated when the step is performed. The steps listed in an agenda may depend on each other. Usually, they will have to be repeated to achieve the goal, similar to the general process proposed by the spiral model of software engineering. Agendas are presented as tables, see Fig. 5 . Agendas may be nested, and we call the \super-steps" stages (see, e.g., Fig. 4 ).
Agendas are not only a means to guide software development activities. They also support quality assurance because the steps of an agenda may have validation conditions associated with them. These validation conditions state necessary conditions that the artifact must ful ll in order to serve its purpose properly. When formal techniques are applied, some of the validation conditions can be expressed and proven in a formal way. Since the validation conditions that can be stated in an agenda are necessarily application independent, the developed artifact should be further validated with respect to application dependent needs.
Working with agendas proceeds as follows: rst, the software engineer selects an appropriate agenda for the task at hand. Usually, several agendas will be available for the same development activity, which capture di erent approaches to perform the activity. This rst step requires a basic understanding of the problem to be solved. Once the appropriate agenda is selected, the further procedure is xed to a large extent. Each step of the agenda must be performed, in an order that respects the dependencies of steps. The informal description of the step informs the software engineer about the purpose of the step. The templates associated with the step provide the software engineer with patterns that can just be lled in (which nevertheless requires creativity) or modi ed according to the needs of the application at hand. The result of each step is a concrete expression of the language that is used to express the artifact. If validation conditions are associated with a step, they should be checked immediately to avoid unnecessary dead ends in the development. When all steps of the agenda have been performed, a product has been developed that can be guaranteed to ful ll certain application-independent quality criteria. This product should then be subject to further validation, taking the speci c application into account.
Agendas do not aim at replacing creativity, but they tell the software engineer what needs to be done and help avoid omissions and inconsistencies. Their advantage lies in an improvement of the quality of the developed products and in the possibility for reusing the knowledge incorporated in an agenda.
Agenda for Cyclic Software Components
The agenda for cyclic software components consists of three stages, which are shown in Figure 4 . Stage 1 must be performed rst; Stages 2 and 3 can be performed independently of each other. Each of the stages is performed following a subagenda, as described below. As a running example, we use an intelligent cruise control system, which serves to automatically adjust the speed of a vehicle according to the driver's request. In addition to this conventional cruise control functionality, our version uses a sensor to detect a vehicle driving ahead, and adjusts the speed to maintain a certain safety distance. This example is extracted from one of the internal Espress case studies, and modi ed for our illustration purposes.
Stage 1: Context embedding
Embedded software is characterised by the fact that the interfaces to the environment are not standardised to a degree as it is nowadays common for software running on e.g. workstations. Hence, a developer of software for embedded systems should take special care to model the context embedding of the software. In Espress, the context de nition also serves as a starting point for a simulation of the software, using the Statemate tool. The sub-agenda for context embedding is shown in Figure 5 .
Step 1.1: Specify technical interfaces.
The technical interfaces of an embedded software component are usually determined during system design, and cannot be modi ed by the software developer. Since their characteristics and capabilities may have signi cant in uence on the further development, the rst step of context embedding is to describe the technical interfaces in the modelling language. Figure 5 gives templates for describing technical interfaces in our modelling language SZ. The structuring entities of SZ are process classes (the outer boxes in the gure, e.g., TechnicalDefs), which are containers for sets of plain Z declarations, of schema de nitions, and of Statemate statecharts and activity charts. Figure 6 : Technical interfaces of the cruise control schema de nitions introduced with the keyword PORT is to describe data variables that can be shared by a process with its environment. Interpreted standalone, PORT schemata do not di er from plain Z schemata. However, they contribute to the semantics of an entire process class, de ning the variables belonging to the shared data state of instances of the class, as described in Section 2.
For Step 1.1, the agenda in Figure 5 suggests to collect the technical interfaces in process classes called TechnicalSensors and TechnicalActuators, respectively, which contain sets of PORT schemata. The types and constants used to de ne these ports are collected in a third process class, TechnicalDefs, which is included by the other classes. The inclusion of process classes can be interpreted as textual expansion.
The validation conditions associated with Step 1.1 rst require the developer to carefully check whether the types de ned to model the values of sensors and actuators really capture the technical properties of the technical sensors and actuators. The second validation condition suggests to de ne appropriate error values for the types. Finally, all invariants must be satis able, i.e., there must exist legal states of the system ports, which can be checked with HOL-Z in our tool environment.
Validation conditions marked with \ " are informal, whereas validation conditions marked with \`" are formal and hence can be checked with the Espress tools.
Cruise Control. Figure 6 shows how we apply Step 1.1 to the speci cation of the cruise control. The port Lever describes the driver's control lever, which can be used to turn o the cruise control, to increase or decrease the requested speed, to turn o the cruise control, and to resume its operation. The port Pedal models the brake pedal, the port Ahead the distance and relative acceleration with respect to a vehicle driving ahead, and the port Movement provides information about the current speed and acceleration of the vehicle. The port Adjustment describes the output of the cruise control, which consists of an engine torque and a (negative) acceleration for controlling the brake. Variables declared as x : option A carry values of A which may be available or not; we use dfd x to indicate whether the value of the optional variable x is available, val x to refer to that value (if it is de ned), and def v to construct a de ned value from v. If, e.g., the value of the sensor distAhead is not de ned, then no vehicle driving ahead is detected, and if the actuator engineTorque is not de ned, then the cruise control does not a ect the We do not present the full speci cation of the technical interfaces of the cruise control system here. In reality, the technical interfaces are based on the CAN bus architecture. For illustration purposes, we have introduced just one \technical" interface, which will be abstracted in the next section: the port Adjustment.
Step 1.2: Design and specify logical interfaces.
Apart from being non-standardised, the technical interfaces of an embedded software component may be also on a relatively low technical level, which hinders a problem-oriented speci cation. It may therefore be useful to introduce abstractions of the technical interfaces, which is achieved by de ning logical interfaces.
The values of the logical sensors should be totally and uniquely de ned by the technical sensors, and the technical actuators should be totally and uniquely de ned by the logical actuators (see validation conditions associated with this step). In the simplest case, this mapping can be de ned by a conversion function which maps a technical sensor to a logical sensor or a logical actuator to a technical actuator, respectively. In more complex situations, the mapping may require an internal state, for example if a logical sensor accumulates the values of a technical one. In any case, we de ne the mapping by a dedicated process class that describes the conversion by a property schema or by a statechart (in the template of Figure 5 , these classes are called MapLS1 and MapLA1, respectively). These process classes are instantiated as sub-processes of the overall process modelling the system context, as will be seen in the next step.
The rst validation condition associated with Step 1.2 suggests to apply fault tolerance techniques, e.g., consistency checks on sensor values and feedback control to check if actuator commands have been executed appropriately.
Cruise Control. We introduce a logical actuator nominalAccel, which abstracts from the two quite technical values engineControl and brakeControl given in the out- Proving the last two validation conditions amounts to proving that the function accel2torque de ned in the class LogicalDefs is indeed a total function.
Step 1.3: Derive software/context information ow.
The description of the technical interfaces, the logical interfaces, and their mapping induces an activity chart, which is derived from the template given for Step 1.3 in Figure 5 . The activity charts of Statemate used in SZ combine the descriptions of information ow, of instantiation of sub-processes from process classes (rectangular boxes), and of behaviour described by statecharts (rounded boxes). In Figure 5 , the overall description of the system's behaviour aggregates a sub-process Software, as well as sub-processes for mapping technical to logical interfaces. The information ows between these processes are labelled with ports, and semantically describe visibility of shared variables between processes. The aggregation of the statechart Control and the dotted lines are only for documentation purposes; they indicate that Control schedules the activity of the sub-process Software.
The scheduler de ned by Control applies to any cyclic software component developed using this agenda, and is quite simple. It assumes that the software, once running, reads the sensors, computes the actuators, and then suspends itself. The scheduler thus periodically resumes the software in intervals of a certain cycle time. Notationally, Statemate's mechanism for suspending and resuming processes (processes are also called activities in Statemate) is used. The Statemate action sd ! (SOFTWARE) stands for suspending a process, rs ! (SOFTWARE) for resuming, and the condition hg(SOFTWARE) tests whether a process is \hanging", that is suspended. The event tm(en(RUN),CYCLETIME) appears cycleTime time units after the state RUN has been entered, where en stands for \entered", and tm stands for \timeout". Because the result of Step 1.3 can be derived schematically from the parts of the speci cation de ned in Steps 1.1 and 1.2, there are no validation conditions associated with this step.
Cruise Control. Figure 8 shows the result of Step 1.3. We only need to draw the activity chart (where the information ows are already induced by Steps 1.1 and 1.2); the statechart Control can be taken as is from the template in Figure 5 .
Only Software is renamed to CruiseControl.
Step observations form a problem-oriented classi cation of possible situations properties are consistent The systems we study have to ful l certain quality requirements. Typical examples are safety requirements, but also high-level requirements from earlier development phases may be transferred to the software development phase. A common characteristic of quality requirements is that they only address certain selected aspects to be realized by the software { these aspects are important enough to be emphasised explicitly in the speci cation. Technically, quality requirements are formulated as model properties, which have to be logical consequences of the model of the software as it is constructed in Stage 3. With model properties, redundancy is deliberately introduced in the speci cation. This contributes to the potential for checking consistency by deduction, model checking, and systematic testing. Figure 9 describes the agenda for treating quality requirements.
Step 2.1: Collect relevant quality requirements.
The quality requirements are usually de ned during system design. In this step, the ones that are relevant for the software component under development are collected and documented.
Cruise Control. A few of the quality requirements are the following: Activity. The cruise control is allowed to adjust speed only if the driver has activated it through the control lever, and did not deactivate it since then. Asymptotic String Stability. If several vehicles using the cruise control drive in a queue, a sudden change of the speed of one of them must lead to changes of speed of the the following vehicles which fade away along the queue. Because cruise control systems are already on the market, these requirements are well understood and known to be realizable with our technical interfaces. Hence, the validation condition associated with this step is ful lled.
Step 2.2: Specify model properties.
It is not realistic to demand that all quality requirements be speci ed formally as model properties. For example, the property of string stability cannot be expressed easily, because it would require to formalise aspects of the mathematics of control 5 . However, where it is possible, the quality requirements should be expressed as model properties, to be treated automatically in a review stage later on.
A useful guideline for specifying the model properties is to rst introduce abstractions of common situations observable on the interfaces. In the template of Figure 9 , these are introduced by the schemata Obs1, Obs2, and applied in the temporal formula of the assertion box.
The rst (informal) validation condition suggests that the model properties be oriented on a classi cation of the relevant situations of the observable behaviour of the system, whereas the second validation condition is an obvious consistency requirement.
Cruise Control. In Figure 10 , we de ne schemata for observing the situations where the driver activates and deactivates the cruise control, and where the cruise control produces an output value to adjust speed. These schemata are used to formalise one of the quality requirements, namely the safety-condition \Activity". Intuitively, the temporal formula given in the property-box Activity can be interpreted as a kind of regular expression: the admissible traces of the behaviour of the cruise control repeatedly consists of an interval where adjustment of speed is not performed, followed by an interval where the driver activates the cruise control (adjustment of speed still does not take place), followed by an interval where the driver continuously does not deactivate the cruise control. Thereby, the temporal predicate d p e holds for those nite or in nite intervals where the predicate p holds in each state. Note that we do not say anything about whether the cruise control actually ever adjusts speed; we just say when it should not do so. This is typical for specifying model properties, where we are only interested in selected aspects of the software.
Stage 3: Model construction
In this stage, we construct a model for the cyclic software component under consideration. There are several strategies for doing so, which depend on the problem to solve. Here we consider two variants: model construction by functional decomposition, and model construction by partitioning behaviour into operational modes.
Step The problem to solve by the cyclic software component might be more adequately solved by decomposing it into subproblems, instead of giving a monolithic solution. The reasons for this may be that the problem is to large to be tackled in a monolithic way, that a decomposition follows naturally from the structure of the problem, or that existing components should be integrated into the design.
For a cyclic software component which computes output values from input values and an internal state, a decomposition is naturally achieved in a functional style, based on information ow between the subcomponents (Figure 11 ). This is also the approach the Statemate tool supports best.
Step 3a.1: Design functional decomposition using an activity chart.
Guidelines on how to perform a functional decomposition depend on the application. A useful approach is data-oriented, and considers intermediate values to be computed by the subcomponents. If we reuse existing components, these intermediate values are naturally their output interfaces. However, in general, decomposition is a problem that requires creativity. Hence our agenda suggests to rst design the principle information ow between subcomponents by drawing an activity chart. The precise speci cation of the intermediate interfaces themselves is postponed until the next step 6 .
Once an information ow between the subcomponents has been de ned, the data dependencies canonically induce a scheduling as described by the statechart Control of the template for Step 3a.1 in Figure 11 . Each subcomponent is treated similarly to a cyclic-software component: once it is resumed, it is expected to compute its output values and then to suspend itself. The scheduler activates the subcomponents one after the other in the order induced by the information ow.
The validation conditions associated with this step ensure that the component eventually produces an output if the subcomponents do so, and that all sensors and actuators are actually used by the system. Cruise Control. We assume that we can reuse an existing component that implements a speed adjustment: it calculates a nominal acceleration from a given nominal speed and the vehicle movement. What is left to do is to introduce a subcomponent which controls activation and deactivation of the cruise control, and which decides
Step to use the speed requested by the driver or a speed lower than the nominal speed to keep a certain safety distance. The decomposition leads to the activity chart given in Figure 12 , where NominalSpeed is a newly introduced internal interface, ModeControl is the subcomponent controlling the activation of the cruise control, and SpeedControl is the reused component.
Step 3a.2: Specify the internal interfaces.
In this step, we specify the internal interfaces as they have been introduced in the last step. This step is similar to the introduction of interfaces in Stage 1; therefore, details are omitted here.
Step 3a.3: Recursively apply Stage 3.
For subcomponents yielded by the decomposition and which are not reused, we apply Stage 3 again. For the cruise control, this applies to the subcomponent ModeControl, which we specify using a di erent sub-agenda, shown in Figure 13 . The problem to solve by the software component might be adequately modelled by introducing operational modes (such as passive, active, emergency, etc.). A cyclic computation then triggers transitions between the operational modes. The agenda in Figure 13 describes how to proceed for this modelling technique.
Step 3b.1: De ne modes by initial statechart.
In this step we introduce the di erent operational modes of the software component. Technically, this is done by de ning an initial statechart (without transitions), where states or combinations of parallel states represent modes. We introduce this chart before the internal data (next step), because we might want to specify invariants on the data that depend on the current operational mode. (in SZ, the predicate instate S can be used to test whether we are in state S).
The initial statechart contains a static reaction (en(M1) or en(M2)/sd!(SOFTWARE)) which suspends the software whenever a mode is entered, signalling to the environment that the computation of the current cycle has been nished. A static reaction in Statemate is syntactically similar to a transition label guard/action; semantically, its action is executed whenever the guard becomes true.
Cruise Control. The complete statechart with transitions as it is obtained in Step 3b.3 is given in Figure 15 , and will be explained there.
Step 3b.2: De ne internal data state. Internal data is introduced in SZ by a schema with the DATA role, its initialisation by a schema with the INIT role. The validation conditions associated with this step stem from the recommended Z methodology 46].
Cruise Control. In Figure 14 , the internal data of the subcomponent ModeControl is de ned. It declares a variable requestedSpeed, whose value (if dened) describes the nominal speed which the last time has been requested by the driver. Initially, requestedSpeed is unde ned.
Step 3b.3: De ne transitions between states of statechart. In this step, we re ne the statechart developed in Step 3b. Due to the static reaction introduced in Step 3b.1, the software is suspended whenever a transition reaches a state corresponding to an operational mode. Intermediate states do not necessarily lead to a suspension, as it is the case, e.g., for the internal state S in the template for Step 3b.3 in Figure 13 . The validation conditions associated with this step require the developer to check if all inputs are treated appropriately, and to show that the system behaves deterministically. Moreover, useless states that cannot be reached are not allowed. An important condition to check is whether mode transitions terminate, that is starting from any mode, for all possible inputs another mode is reached in a nite number of steps. The template state-chart given for Step 3b.3 in Figure 13 shows that this condition is not trivial if intermediate states are used (it is possible that the process hangs in state S).
Cruise Control. Applying Step 3b.3 to the subcomponent ModeControl leads to the statechart, guards and operations given in Figure 15 . The statechart does not contain intermediate states. The cartesian product of the state sets fACTIVATED; DEACTIVATEDg and fREQUESTED; CALCULATEDg makes up the set of operational modes. In addition to the declared objects, we use the following Z constants: stepSpeed : SPEED is the o set how to increase or decrease the requested speed, and maxSpeed : SPEED is the maximum requested speed the cruise control is allowed to manage. The function safeDistance : SPEED " LENGTH yields the safe distance to a vehicle ahead in dependency of a driving speed. The function distanceRegulator : Movement Ahead "SPEED represents an algorithm calculating a nominal speed from the movement of the vehicle and information about a vehicle ahead.
Discussion. We have demonstrated that the agenda approach supports the systematic development of requirement speci cations for high quality embedded systems on a non-trivial level of detail which gives substantial guidance to developers. As already noted, agendas are not intended to replace creativity and do not aim at completely automating development processes. Hence, in the rst steps of an agenda, high-level decisions have to be taken. The validation conditions associated with the early steps of an agenda are mostly informal, encouraging developers to carefully re-consider their decisions, see e.g. Step 1.1 of the agenda of Figure 5 . Later steps in an agenda, on the other hand, often have validation conditions associated with them that can be formally expressed and proven. The reason is that in the later steps consistency conditions between the various parts of the speci cation that are already developed can be stated. Step 1.2 of the agenda shown in Figure  5 is an example. Finally, some steps of an agenda (usually the last steps) can be performed in an entirely schematic way, because they merely consist in an appropriate combination of parts of the speci cation developed in earlier steps, see e.g.
Step 1.3 of the agenda of Figure 5 .
Related Work
Our work relates to methodological aspects of software engineering in general, and to approaches to formally specify safety-critical systems.
Development Methods
Other approaches to make software engineering more systematic can be divided into product-oriented and process-oriented approaches.
Product-oriented approaches. Recently, e orts have been made to support re-use of special kinds of software development knowledge: Design patterns 12] have had much success in object-oriented software construction. They represent frequently used ways to combine classes or associate objects to achieve a certain purpose. Furthermore, in the eld of software architecture 39], architectural styles have been de ned that capture frequently used design principles for software systems. Apart from the fact that these concepts are more specialised in their application than agendas, the main di erence is that design patterns and architectural styles do not describe processes but products. A prominent example of knowledge-based software engineering, whose aims closely resemble our own, is the Programmer's Apprentice project 38]. There, programming knowledge is represented by clich es, which are prototypical examples of the artifacts in question. The programming task is performed by \inspection"{ i.e., by choosing an appropriate clich e and customising it. In comparison to clich es, agendas are more process-oriented.
Process-oriented approaches. Chernack 7] uses a concept called checklist to support inspection processes. In contrast to agendas, checklists presuppose the existence of a software artifact and aim at detecting defects in this artifact.
Potts 35] aims at capturing not only strategic but also heuristic aspects of design methods. He uses Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS) 8] as a representation formalism for design methods. IBIS representing heuristics tend to be specialised for particular application domains, and it is not clear how much of an IBIS can be re-used for similar applications.
Johnson and Feather 26 ] take a transformational approach to supporting the speci cation process. Starting out from a simple initial speci cation, evolution transformations are applied. These may change the semantics of the speci cation and add more detail to it. Compared to these, agendas are concepts of a higher level of abstraction and closer to human reasoning.
Related to our aim to provide methodological support for applying formal techniques is the work of Souqui eres and L evy 40]. They support speci cation acquisition with development operators that reduce tasks to subtasks. However, their approach is limited to speci cation acquisition, and the development operators do not provide means to validate the developed speci cation.
Astesiano and Reggio 1] also emphasise the importance of method when using formal techniques. They set up a method pattern for formal speci cation, consisting of context, formalism, and pragmatics. Pragmatics, in turn, contain rationale, guidelines, presentation, and documentation. Guidelines (see 37] for an example) correspond to the steps of an agenda (i.e., an agenda without dependency graph, templates, and validation conditions).
Wile's 43] development language Paddle provides a means of describing procedures for transforming speci cations into programs. Since carrying out a process speci ed in Paddle involves executing the corresponding program, one disadvantage of this procedural representation of process knowledge is that it enforces a strict depth-rst left-to-right processing of the goal structure. The \second generation" process language JIL 42] is more exible in this respect: not only proactive (i.e., xed) but also reactive control speci cations can be given. Representing processes as programs has the advantage that processes are formal objects on which reasoning can be performed. On the other hand, humans nd it easier to follow instructions when they are expressed on a higher level of abstraction than a programming notation can provide.
Process languages are widely used in the eld of software process modelling 10, 11]. Software process modelling aims at automated support for software development processes on the level of company processes. The goal is to execute software processes like software 33]. This goal implies that the language used to express processes should be similar to a programming language. Typical activities that are considered in software process modelling are lling in forms, sending emails, using a version control system to check in or check out les, or starting an editor or another tool. In contrast, agendas do not consider company processes but single documents and their semantics. They structure activities that need creativity and do not lend themselves easily to automatic enactment. Therefore, programming language notations are not necessary to express them. All in all, agendas describe activities that are considered atomic in software process modelling. Hence, process modelling techniques are a useful complement to agendas. To obtain realistic processes for larger projects, they should always be used in combination.
Humphrey 24] has devised the personal software process to improve the performance of software engineers. Software engineers are trained to plan and analyze their activities and to perform measurements on them. Personal strengths and weaknesses are identi ed. Based on this knowledge, software engineers improve their personal skills. The personal software process approach is centred around individuals, not around activities, as agendas are. As with process modelling techniques, the two approaches do not exclude but complement each other. The methods captured in agendas can only be worked out by highly competent individuals.
Safety-critical systems
Moser's and Melliar-Smith's approach to the formal veri cation of safety-critical systems 31] comprises the speci cation, design and implementation phases. They use a reliability model for the processors that execute the program. This enables them to take computer failures into account, an aspect we do not address. On the other hand, their approach does not cover the validation of the top-level speci cation, an issue that we pay particular attention to.
The use of model-based languages like Z or VDM 27] in the area of system safety has been thoroughly investigated. Several case studies use VDM, e.g. the British government regulations for storing explosives 32], a railway interlocking system 15], and a water-level monitoring system 44]. Mukherjee's and Stavridou's as well as Hansen's work, however, focus on adequately modelling safety requirements, independently of the question of whether software is employed or not. Consequently, they do not discuss issues speci c to the construction of safety-critical software.
Jacky 25] uses Z to de ne a framework for safety-critical systems that emphasises safety interlocking. McDermid and Pierce 29] de ne a graphical notation based on a variant of statecharts 17] that is translated into Z for the purpose of mechanical validation. This notation is used to specify and develop software for programmable logic controllers. Halang and Kr amer 14] also focus on programmable logic controllers. They describe a development process, from the formalisation of requirements to the testing of the constructed program. They use the speci cation language Obj and the Hoare calculus, and their choice is motivated by the available tool support. The speci cation language Obj is weaker than SZ because Obj only allows conditional equations to be stated. Ravn et al. 36] use the duration calculus to express functional requirements and safety constraints. The Duration Calculus is a real-time interval logic based on state durations. A system is modelled by a collection of state variables that are functions of time, modelled by real numbers. System requirements are speci ed by means of duration formulas that are predicates containing integrals over state assertions (predicates on state variables). This form of speci cation allows to specify requirements like critical durations of system states or progress and stability requirements. Its most serious drawbacks are, rst, that the system state is constituted by a plain set of state variables. Second, (at least in the requirements speci cation) no means are provided to hierarchally decompose a system. Heisel and S uhl 22, 20] use a combination of Z and real-time CSP 9] to formally specify software for embedded real-time systems. Their reference architectures and agendas are similar to the one used in Espress. 6 
Conclusions
Agendas provide more than a process description. They are an overall documentation of processes and products, and they are easily adjusted to similar problems. Agendas together with templates combine both process and product oriented approaches (see Section 5.1).
Besides providing guidance for developers and ensuring some application independent quality aspects of the developed product, agendas o er the following advantages:
Agendas make software processes explicit, comprehensible, and assessable. Giving concrete steps to perform an activity and de ning the dependencies between the steps make processes explicit. The process becomes comprehensible for third parties because the purpose of the various steps is described informally in the agenda. Thus, agendas may be subject to evaluation. Agendas standardise processes and products of software development. Agendas structure development processes. The development of an artifact following an agenda always proceeds in a way consistent with the steps of the agenda and their dependencies. Thus, processes supported by agendas are standardised. The same holds for the products: since applying an agenda results in instantiating the templates given in the agenda, all products developed with an agenda have a similar structure. Agendas support maintenance and evolution of the developed artifacts. Understanding a document developed by another person is less di cult when the document was developed following an agenda than without such information. Each part of the document can be traced back to a step in the agenda, which reveals its purpose. To change the document, the agenda can be \replayed". The agenda helps focus attention on the parts that actually are subject to change. Agendas are a promising starting point for sophisticated machine support. They can form the basis of a process-centred software engineering environment (PSEE) 13]. Such a tool would lead its users through the process described by the agenda.
Agendas are language-independent to a large extent. Changing the language in which the developed speci cation is expressed consists mostly in replacing the templates of the various steps, and e ects the steps themselves very little, see the agenda presented in 21].
The validation conditions are a very important aspect of agendas. Clearly, the errors revealed by failing to demonstrate validations conditions of an agenda can only be of an application-independent nature. Checking the validation conditions cannot guarantee, e.g., that a system is adequately modelled by a developed speci cation. Nevertheless, many common errors can be discovered. As reported by Heitmeyer et al. 23] , in the certi cation of the Darlington plant (which cost $ 40M), \the reviewers spent too much of their time and energy checking for simple, application-independent properties." To improve this situation, Heitmeyer et al. have implemented a tool that performs consistency checks. Since this tool is not tailored for any application domain, it can only check very general consistency conditions. In comparison, the validation conditions provided by agendas are much more to the point (see e.g. the validation conditions of Step 3.b.3 of the agenda shown in Fig. 13 ), such that more speci c tool support for checking validation conditions generated by agendas is conceivable. But even if no speci c support tools for agendas are available, agendas allow developers to use existing tools, e.g., Statemate to check the speci cation by simulation, or type checkers and theorem provers for Z to check some of the formal validation conditions. For these reasons, agendas play a central role in the Espress methodology, and we have used the agenda approach for supporting further activities of the general development process as shown in Fig. 1 . An agenda has been developed for the activity of safety analyses, which is based on common techniques such as FTA (failure-tree analysis) and SHARD (software hazard analysis and resolution design).
Cyclic software components, though important in practice, are indeed a rather simple software architecture. An extension of our agenda for this architecture to certain kinds of event-triggered software components, which are also studied in the case studies of Espress 3] , has been developed in 45] . Signi cant parts of the agenda given in this paper, in particular from Stage 1, context embedding, and Stage 2, quality requirements, have been reused.
